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Abstract
The history of food policy in Africa started with the beginning of independence
with the adoption of the strategy based on the planned development model.
However, the financial and administrative planning requirements were felt quickly.
By the early 80s, the debt crisis led African economies to abandon the policy of
self-sufficiency and to adopt a so-called liberal agro-food strategy. In this context,
food security based on external trade and its requirements became integral parts of
structural adjustment programs. Thus, Africa took a stand before the rest of the
world in the controlling of extraversion. Despite mixed results, in January 1995,
Africa strengthened its accession to a liberal system by adopting the agreement on
agriculture (AoA). Again, the promises would not match up to the results. In fact,
the sector remains far from the liberal recommendations advocated by the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Between protectionism and bilateralism, the
liberalization of agricultural products was certainly imperfect, but full of future
promise for Africa. A more just and multilateral agreement based on development
issues is one of the cornerstones of trade that connects to food security.
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JEL Classification: F13
In the early 1980s, Africa adopted a food strategy based on external trade. Thus, the
continent was opened before the rest of the world. In 1995, the other members of the new World
Trade Organization (WTO) came to join the continent by adhering to the Multilateral Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA). This commitment should have ensured Africa’s food autonomy, distributed
the cards of the game between different countries, and erased substantially the distortions of
agricultural trade.
Many studies predicted the significant gains to Africa in the long-term, despite some
imbalances in food security in the short-term. Nearly eighteen years after the adoption of the
Sasakawa Africa Association (SAA), the WTO members have not liberalized agricultural
products. The distortion measures persist and have spread to all actors of international trade, and
access to markets remains relatively difficult. Yet in the meantime, in 2008, there had been an
unprecedented reversal of agro-food markets. In a few days, the price of food products experienced
an unprecedented increase. Many populations of the developing world, especially in Africa,
demonstrated and demanded "the right to eat." This was the beginning of the revolts for the hungry.
Despite this fact and a willingness to stop the extension of the Doha Round, the WTO is
struggling to find an agreement on the issue of agriculture. December 7, 2013 marked the
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conclusion of the Doha agreement, or at least its rescue. The date would mark the conclusion of a
new agreement on agriculture that is still struggling to be defined. In this context, the objective of
this article is to give a brief assessment of the current state of trade liberalization of agricultural
products, and its potential effects on food security in African countries while showing that
international trade is likely to improve the situation of food security in African countries, but under
what conditions? This is the question that I intend to address in this paper.
The African countries are dependent on food imports so the objective of the study is to
analyze the effects of trade liberalization on food security based on the capacity of the countries
to finance food imports through their export revenues. In order to do this study, we used a
methodology based on descriptive analysis of the data that comes from the following main bases:
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), WTO, UNCTAD (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development), and the Center of International Trade.
Persistence of Protectionist Agricultural Policies
Agriculture is one area in which the liberalization of business collides with the protectionist
trade policies of some WTO members. The sector's situation is characterized by an impeded access
to the market and a standardization of anti-competitive practices that seem to have become a
customary strategy more or less tolerated, despite objections.
Hindered Access to the Market
For a long period, agriculture has been regarded as a specific sector. Thus, it does not meet
the same requirements as other sectors (Wongkaew, 2010). Its openness should be done gradually
while taking into account the reservations of the WTO members and without undermining the food
security of their populations. It is in this light that the AoA improved the market access for its
different members (Carreau and Juillard, 2005). Its revenues, although controversial, cannot be
denied. Even if it turns out that the tariffs applied to agricultural products remain relatively higher
than those of industrial products (Graph 1), that is not the problem. It probably resides in the
methodology of the taxation, and its impact on the structure of small economies like the African
economies (FAO, 2003).

Figure 1: Average of Duties / Tariffs in the World. Source: Data WTO.
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Furthermore, the fixation of the tariffs based on the value of the product seems to be
common sense: the products are sold at different prices depending on their nature and their level
of processing on the market. Progressivity has therefore emerged as a more or less equitable
method. However, behind a goal may hide another, less transparent and protectionist, whose
effects can be damaging to the other members that participate in international trade.
As part of the comparative advantages theory, it appears that the revenues in trade come
from the nature of the specialization of an economy. In other words, a specialization is
advantageous depending on the nature of the goods produced by a given economy. In practice, the
more a product is processed, the greater its value. However, although initially an economy is
specialized in the production of commodities with low value added, it must participate in
international trade because specialization is not a static process. The rise in the value chains is
always possible. However, the progressivity of tariffs produces an opposite effect and reinforces,
to some extent, the specialization of African countries in the production of commodities that
remain highly subject to market fluctuations (ECA, 2013). In 2011, the agricultural commodities
represented 10% of the total merchandise exported by Africa while the share of finished products
represented 3.5% (WTO, 2012).
While the AoA called to facilitate market access of tropical products (the main source of
income for African countries), it seems that the response differed depending on the degree of
transformation of the product (Table 1). Take the example of cocoa, the raw material was taxed
respectively by the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada to 0%. When it came to
chocolate, the tariffs tended to increase considerably depending on the strategy of the preceding
importing country (Table 1). In countries like Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria and Ghana, parts of
chocolate products have tended to regress since 1970. The case of Nigeria provides a good
illustration of the negative effect that the progressivity of the tariffs can have on the structure of
African exports. Nigeria is the fourth largest producer of cocoa in the world. Cocoa has been the
second most exported product after oil in this country since 2007. The cocoa exports increased by
47% between 2006 and 2010 reaching 822.8 million dollars. Again, only about 20% of Nigeria's
cocoa production is processed locally. The rest is exported non-transformed. The paradox is more
striking when one considers that Nigeria imports a large share of chocolate from Europe and the
United States. Nigeria would profit if it produced chocolate not only to meet domestic demand,
but also to conquer new markets and to develop a whole range of products derived from the raw
material: cosmetics, food (like confectionery, biscuits, etc.). In this example, one can easily infer
the potential impact of “progressive tariffs [...] on the process of transformation of the agricultural
products; that is to say the various stages of transformation of a commodity like cocoa into finished
products like chocolate” (ECA, 2013).
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Table 1
MFN Bound Average Tariffs in Major Importing Developed Countries, Selected Products
Product
Cocoa

Coffee
Oranges

Ananas
Hides and Skins
Sugar

Primary / Degree
of Processing

MFN Bound Average Tariffs
EU

UE

Japan

Canada

Beans

0

0

0

0

Chocolate

6,9

21,1

21,3

59,0

Unripe

0

0

0

0

Roasted

0

9,0

12,0

0,4

Fresh

3,5

16,7

24,0

0

Juice

11,0

34,9

31,0

1,0

Fresh

1,2

5,8

12,1

0

Juice

4,1

11,6

24,3

0

Raw

0

0

0

0

Tanned

3,0

5,4

23,5

6,3

Raw

32,8

134,7

224,9

8,5

42,5

161,1

328,1

107,0

Refined
Source: Calculations of the FAO services.

Besides the progressivity of tariffs, one can observe that the levels of tariffs are abnormally
high on certain products (Abdelmaliki and Sandretto, 2011). Tariff peaks do not concern only
tropical products, but almost all agro food products (Table 2). This situation can reinforce the
specialization of African countries in the production of basic agricultural commodities and not
those more intensive in capital, and thus with higher added value. The opening of international
markets could contribute to encouraging African countries to produce more sophisticated goods in
order to conquer new markets and to improve their ability to export while meeting domestic
demand. It is difficult to consider that market access of the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) members
has been improved because the essential tariff protection was not dismantled (Ben Hammouda et
al. 2005). For example, Switzerland applies the maximum most favored nation (MFN) tariffs that
are lower than or equal to 1000 on a number of products like dairy, animal origin, fruits, and
vegetables, and greater than 100 on other products like tea, coffee, beverages, tobacco, sugar and
sweets. Table 2 provides more information about the persistence and pervasiveness of these tariffs
to "alpine silhouettes" (FAO, 2004). Therefore, market access is not the only aspect of the AoA
that is disputable or controversial.
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Table 2
MFN Tariffs Imposed and Maximum Average of Some Developed Countries
MFN tariffs means (1) / and maximum (2)
Product

Canada

United
States

European
Union

Japan

Norway

Swiss

Products of
Animal Origin

30.5

621

2.4

26

23.0

140

15.7

472

174.6

741

156.4

<1000

Dairy products

246,8

314 19.1

92

55.2

205

178.5

687

69.4

213

163.4

<1000

Fruits,
vegetables,
plants

3.5

19

4.9

132

11.5

170

12.3

378

30.6

520

22.6

<1000

Coffee, tea

10,4

213

3.2

23

6.2

25

16.3

182

8.5

115

5.2

191

Cereals and
other
preparations

20.3

277

3.5

54

16.3

167

68.3

827

75.3

640

21.7

293

Oilseeds, fats
and oils

4.8

218

4.5

164

7.1

171

11.0

587

35.1

357

28.6

180

Sugars and
sweets

5.0

27

16.6 123

29.1

131

28.4

124

25.7

134

12.8

207

4.2

256 15.4 350

19.2

162

15.4

57

26.7

496

42.7

600

0.0

0,0

4,6

19

0.0

0,0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

9.0

606

4.6

67

4.8

131

4.2

441

30.0

<10
00

8.5

778

Beverages and
tobacco
Cottons
Other
agricultural
products

Source: World Tariff Profiles, WTO, ITC (International Trade Center) and CNUCDE, 2012.
The Anticompetitive Practices: Use Strategy
Market access is not the only point of the ASA that is controversial today and must be
renegotiated. The AoA has some positive points, but those will not be in question in this study.
One of its merits is that it has the ability to distinguish between the "good and bad" subsidies in
order to limit trade distortion, and to make as clear as possible international trade (Zouré, 2011).
Subsidies have often been the point of contention in international negotiations, particularly because
of their damaging effects on the prices of food products and ultimately on the economies of the
countries that export those products (Ben Hammouda et al., 2005).
However, even though the AoA have gradually reduced the support for distortion, they
remain in use. Between the period of 1986-1988 and 2009, the subventions accorded to OECD
producers increased by 4.75% (Table 3). Over the same period, the share of support for market
prices fell by 38 (82%) (Table 3) in favor of support to inputs and revenues which, according to
current indicators, have the largest distortion effect on trade (Rainelli, 2007). Those measures
counteract the market forces and divert the flow of north south trade to the chagrin of African
countries (Baldin, 2011). In fact, regardless of their nature, when the subsidies distort the market,
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they generate a surplus of production, and thus lead to lower world prices for the products
concerned, and this practice compounds the detriment to African countries because their revenues
from exports decline. Thus, a significant proportion of the rural population turns from this activity
and moves to big cities in search of a better life. In most cases, this simply contributes to increase
the degree of insecurity and poverty in African cities (Raman, 2005).

Table 3
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) and Market Price Support (MPS) Million
Years
Estimation of
Support to Producers
(PSE)
Supporters at market
prices (1) (MPS)
WHOSE part of MPS
(in %)
Support to inputs (2)
WHOSE in % of
MPS
Income support and
area (3)
WHOSE in % of
MPS

1986-88

1995-97

2008-2010

2008

2009

2010p

239,160

254,048

246,287

261,074

250,523

227,265

183,756

171,573

108,516

111,623

112,411

101,515

76,83

67,53

44,06

42,75

44,83

44,66

20,171

24,041

32,797

34,182

31,640

32,569

9,46

13,31

13,09

12,62

14,33

18,735

41,778

35,663

38,237

35,437

33,315

7,83

16,44

14,48

14,64

14,14

14,65

8,43

Source: OECD, Database PSE and CSE, 2011. P = Provisional calculation, MPS = market price support.
The numbers (1), (2), (3) and (4) indicate the level of the trade distortion by measurements.

To avoid the scenario depicted and maintain the export revenues at a suitable level, one
possible solution is to subsidize domestic producers. This is a solution that has the disadvantage
of increasing market instability while decreasing the foreign exchange reserves. In other words,
the subsidies create a vicious circle that encloses the African countries in the ruts of pauperization.
Subsidizing domestic producers is more detrimental when it is known that the most
subsidized products continue to be food products (Table 5). For example, it is estimated that the
wheat received in 2008-2010 garnered 2,815 million USD in all of the OECD countries. Yet, this
product is by far one of the least subsidized foods. For comparison, rice received 17,657 million
USD during the same period, which is more than six times the amount for wheat (Table 4).
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Table 4
The Transfers to Producers of a Single Product (TSP) Million USD
Products

1986-88

1995-97

2008-10

16,020

3,673

2,815

TSP in percentage

43,2

8,8

5

Corn
TSP to producers

11,012

2,724

2,849

TSP in percentage

36,2

7,4

3,9

25,346

31,241

17,657

TSP in percentage

79.8

75.4

54.3

Colza
TSP to producers

1,833

52

140

TSP in percentage

47.5

1.2

1

Sunflower
TSP to producers

1,161

75

153

TSP in percentage

47.3

4.5

5.4

1,101

354

1,646

8.7

2

4.6

Sugar
TSP to producers

4,988

5,727

2,659

TSP in percentage

50.8

41.2

22

45,217

42,226

12,760

59.2

44.7

10.6

18,034

19,805

13,882

27.8

25.1

13.7

4,284

4,085

1,522

51.7

39.8

14.7

3,224

5,019

8,662

TSP in percentage

13.3

13.7

14.1

Eggs
TSP to producers

3,379

2,374

1,545

TSP in percentage

21.6

12.3

5.3

Wheat
TSP to producers

Rice
TSP to producers

Soy
TSP to producers
TSP in percentage

Milk
TSP to producers
TSP in percentage
Bovine meat
TSP to producers
TSP in percentage
Sheep meat
TSP to producers
TSP in percentage
Poultry meat
TSP to producers

Source: OECD, Database PSE and CSE, 2011.
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Table 4 does not present an exhaustive list of the subsidized products. There are others like
cotton that are supported by direct aid. Direct payments are to ensure a minimum income to farmers
regardless of the quantity of production (decoupling). These products were introduced within the
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union in 1993, and are an integral part of the US
Farm Bill (American agricultural policy) (Desriers et al., 2009). They are also increasingly used
by emerging countries like China, India, and Brazil. This practice has been strongly criticized
because of the negative impact that it has had on the African cotton producers.
Since 2002, the US Farm Bill has increased the level of aid to US producers. This increase
has resulted in an overproduction of cotton that has led to a decrease in world prices. In 2001, the
US cotton farmers received $311 billion of support. This decision had a strong detrimental impact
on the economy of some African countries, like Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, and Mali, for whom
the export revenues for cotton accounted 5-10 % of GDP and 30-40% on average of the total export
revenues in 2001. On June 10, 2003, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, said in the
committee meeting of WTO trade negotiations, “By this, Burkina Faso lost in 2001, 1% of its GDP
and 12% of its export revenues, Mali 1.7% and 8%, and Benin 1.4% and 9%. The very high levels
of the subsidies accorded to the cotton producers in certain member countries of the WTO are one
of the direct causes and major problems encountered by the world cotton market. These subsidies
artificially increase the offer on international markets and depress export revenues” (Stiglitz and
Charlton, 2005). The union of these countries into the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha
Round (named the group C4) resulted, in late 2005 at the Hong Kong Conference, in the decision
to suspend all forms of the subsidies on cotton. However, this decision was not implemented
because of China's opposition. In March 2011, the cotton prices had reached a record level in the
markets, which was $2.27 USD on the pound, and declined under the pressure of an abundant
supply to 70 cents USD. Volatility is one of the problems created by trade distortion, and another
problem that undermines trade and development of much of the developing world. The case of
cotton provides a good illustration of what distortion to trade is, and why it seems necessary to
guard against this anti-competitive practice. Beyond this, it recalls how, it is not always easier to
choose between "good and bad subsidies." A subsidy may hide one problem from another with a
pernicious effect on international trade.
Food Security and Trade Negotiations: The Cleaving Other Aspects of the SAA
The way the AoA was envisaged has undermined food insecurity. Indeed, food security
appears to have been compromised in African countries, the big loser in globalization. The current
impasse of the Doha Round has not facilitate the situation, and has contributed to its deterioration.
An Agreement that Undermines Food Security
The period before the beginning of the SAA had sparked hope for the long-term
improvement of food security in African countries. Aware that in the short term, the increase in
prices due to the reduction of the subsidies to farmers and the decrease of the customs tax would
have a potentially detrimental effect on food security of developing countries that are net food
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importers, some provisions were adapted under special and differential treatment (SDT) to absorb
these effects.
In the long-term, the remediation of agricultural trade should open new market
opportunities for African countries. The conquest of the new markets on a more equitable basis
might have encouraged countries to develop the agro-food sector in order to go up in the value
chain of agricultural products. That is to say to leverage effects that increase the export revenues
of these countries (Eba Nguema & Assoumou, 2014).
However, almost eighteen years after the beginning of the implementation of the
Marrakesh Agreement, the protectionist agricultural policies of various members have been
partially dismantled. On the tariff level, in accordance with what was mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs, the core of the protection persists. Progressivity, escalation and tariff peaks remain
relevant and contribute to diminishing the efforts to promote access to member markets. All these
measures have had a negative effect on trade diversification of African countries and, to some
extent, on their export revenues. The purchasing power of these countries has also been affected
by the proliferation of the subsidies beyond the regulatory mechanisms of the WTO. The
proliferation of the subsidies has distorted the effect and incited the subsidization that ultimately
increases volatility and market instability. On March 23, 2012, 44 African countries were
designated as net food importers by the Agriculture Committee of the WTO. These included 34
LDCs that are highly dependent on revenue from the export of the agricultural commodities. How
can the import of food be financed when the prices of the products that one exports are increasingly
unstable? How can the peasantry be maintained when the purchase price of farm products
decreases? The blockage of the Doha Round and the current economic crisis have continued to
reinforce the concerns that the different participants and observers have faced since they are related
to higher costs of anticompetitive practices, and are impacting the economic and food situation of
African countries.
Impasse in the Doha Round
On November 14, 2001, representatives of world trade met in Doha under the auspice of
the WTO, and began the first round of negotiations of the young organization. Its main objective
was to correct the mistakes of the past by giving more prominence to developing countries in
international trade. According to Article 2 of the Doha Declaration, the members agreed that
"international trade [can] play a major role in promoting economic development and poverty
reduction. [They also recognize] the need for all [people] to take advantage of the opportunities
and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. [Going from the observation that
the majority of WTO members are developing countries, they agree to integrate] their needs and
interests at the heart of the Work Program adopted in this Declaration." It was an ambitious day
that opened the Doha Development Agenda considering that only a few years earlier, in 1999, the
Seattle ministerial conference ended in an acrimonious climate marred by anti-globalization
protests and opposition from developing countries to the Singapore issues (Madeley, 2006). No
doubt, the enthusiasm of a new round promising "growth, development and prosperity" declared
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by the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick had momentarily cleared the Seattle divisions.
However, the participants were not counting on the interest, the game of alliances, the oppositions,
and north-south antagonism. It seemed that the WTO had become what UNCTAD was in the 60s
- a place of confrontation between north and south, although in practice the reality was more
diverse. There was one reason for this situation. While the Doha Round should have been
completed by 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, this end was constantly programmed to a later date. Why
this extension? The reason was tied to the obstinacy of the developing countries to focus their
voices on issues that reflected their interests and not on engagement in trade negotiations that
might affect them, and more generally to obstruct trade development (Stiglitz, 2005). This is
probably why agriculture remains one of the points that blocks trade negotiations. In fact,
agriculture was the area on which the developing countries were ready to focus their efforts
provided that the most developed countries agreed to do the same. If not, the negotiations would
follow a path of anticompetitive practices to the detriment of the smaller economies. Beyond the
nature of the sector and its financial and strategic importance, the main difficulty blocking the
progress of the current negotiations came from the fact that the sector had remained too far out of
the reach of International trade rules (Dufourt, 2012). This situation created the winners and the
losers. Whereas the negotiations were to equitably redistribute the cards of the trade game between
the different members, it became evident that the winners were less inclined to apply the liberal
orthodoxy advocated by the WTO (Voituriez, 2009).
Nevertheless, recent years seem to bring good omens and portend a favorable outcome to
the Doha Round. In 2011, in Geneva, members apparently found the convergence points in almost
all discussions on agriculture despite some misgivings from Japan and Canada on proposals
affecting sensitive and special products. Members must resolve differences between China, India
and the United States concerning the threshold for special safeguard measures and corrective
action. The question remains whether the rate could exceed the previous bound rate in the Doha
Round. Until a consensus can be found, agriculture will continue to obstruct the smooth
functioning of the multilateral system and make a game for bilateralism (Lamy, 2006).
Although December 17, 2013 in Bali, the closure of the Doha Development Round was
initiated, the agricultural issue remains unresolved and impaired by antagonism and by the
emerging countries who are against the traditional agricultural powers. Yet the current situation of
the international agro-food market argues for an efficient reform of the sector. It only makes good
sense that the different members should find a solution that can satisfy the different positions
involved.
Fairer Multilateral Trade
This section will discuss some suggestions that can ensure a better fit for African
economies as to affect the opening of the agriculture sector for food security. This will be done by
analyzing market access and subsidies.
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Promoting Market Access
The food security objectives often differ from those of opening trade, but "for fairer trade"
based on development, it is important to pay special attention to the aspects that can have a positive
and not a destabilizing effect on the developing economies. Knowing that the link between
development, agriculture, poverty and food is important, the current negotiations should take into
account the agro-food situation that is particularly delicate in the African countries that are
promoting products for which they have a comparative advantage by gradually opening the sectors
that are most sensitive to international competition.
As part of the future "Bali Package" in the agricultural section, it would be desirable to
give primacy to tropical products that are the main sources of foreign currency for African
countries. These countries should have easier access to the external markets. The tariffs should
therefore be lower than those applied to other agricultural products. The goal is to facilitate their
marketing. Similarly, in accordance with what was mentioned in the previous sections, a sensible
approach in this area would be that the sanitary and phytosanitary standards should be reduced at
the international protection threshold. In this context, any other form of redundant protection must
be removed.
Beyond the measures for increasing export revenues, the whole point of this agreement
relies, in the long term, on its ability to encourage the African countries that import food products
to stimulate and promote food production. To do this, the new measures of the SAA should allow
these countries to maintain a level of efficient protection. In fact, the tariff thresholds granted to
emerging countries such as China, India, Taiwan, and Brazil should not be similar to those granted
to the African countries that are net food importers. This is similar concerning the adjustment
period. Moreover, the concept of special products should be redefined in order to extend the scope
in a larger portion of developing countries. When does a product present a particular interest for a
country or a population? Beyond the economic aspect, the food security aspect seems to be a
determining factor in the concept of product sensitivity. Those products considered as sensitive
would be any cereal product that is used for the alimentation of the population or the animals in
the poor and net food importing countries.
Also, contrary to the ideas received, all were not addressed in the tariff plan. While NTBs
represent the most pernicious forms of protectionism in comparison to the preceding forms, it
seems that the members have not attacked the core of tariff protection. The tariff peaks and
progressivity as a method of fixing tariffs lead to tariff escalation. In other words, significant
differences exist in the different levels of agro-food processing. In the previous sections, we took
the example of the FAO Aid. Gaps existed between beans, powder and cocoa paste. The conclusion
arrived at was that these abnormally high rates spoiled any hope of diversification and progression
in the value chains in the countries that are major exporters. At this time of the agribusiness, it
would be important that the SAA eliminate such practices. Tariff escalation often indicates the
existence of the peaks applied to certain products like dairy, cereal and others. A rebalancing of
the applied tariffs must be conducted to remove the peaks, and allow tariffs to lose their Alpine
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aspects. But all these measures can have meaning only if they are accompanied by the elimination,
or substantial reduction, of the subsidies.
Overcoming the Grants
The subsidies given to production or exports have contrasting effects on the prices of the
agricultural products. They increase the variability and the depreciation of prices. Agriculture
remains, despite the existence of the SAA, "a lawless zone" in which, within a few years, the
developed economies can become commercial powers because of subsidies. At the time of writing
this work, the new farm bill has not been passed, but it has already raised many concerns about the
amount of aid accorded to the American farmers. One of the consequences of the subsidies is that
they create a diversion of the trade flow to countries that produce greater quantities at low prices.
In other words, they distort competition. The recent episode of African cotton gave a good
illustration of the possible effects of subsidies on smaller economies. To redistribute the cards of
the game, it would be important to proceed to the total elimination of all forms of export subsidies
on products that compose a major part of the export revenues of developing countries, except the
measures that have a neutral effect on trade.
Furthermore, the implementation of such measures would require a certain transition
period to cushion the potential damaging impact of the increase of prices resulting from a
substantial reduction of the subsidies on the net importer countries. But, the fairness is that the
countries that have been adversely impacted by the lower prices of commodities must be
"compensated." To do this, one solution concerns the ability of the WTO to authorize an
exceptional use of production subsidies in order to boost food production of the small net food
importing economies. This subjection is not for seeing the developing economies distort the
competition. The goal is to repair, at least in part, the injustice suffered.
Conclusion
The multilateral agreement on agriculture appears today, in many ways, unsuited to trade
of agricultural products because of its nature to know and lay the bases for long-term fair trade.
This is probably why it was, in the first years of its existence, called upon to be supplemented by
a series of trade negotiations. However, almost fourteen years after the launch of the Doha Round,
no agreement has been reached on this question. Nevertheless, its rescue comes from a willingness
of the WTO, and its members, to end commercial antagonism and find "common ground" to reach
a new agreement on agriculture that promises to be more complete and less flexible in regulating
exchanges. However, to satisfy all members, the food security of countries most exposed to the
situation of the breaking of the policies must be taken into account, at least on behalf of fairer
multilateral trade. Beyond the fairness, the solution must lead to the reparation of the commercial
security of African countries with a commercial, and not just financial compensation, according to
the slogan of the developing countries in 1964 in Geneva, "Trade not aid."
\
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